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Abstract This paper synthesizes results of the multi-model Energy Modeling Forum 27
(EMF27) with a focus on climate policy scenarios. The study included two harmonized
long-term climate targets of 450 ppm CO2-e (enforced in 2100) and 550 pm CO2-e
(not-to-exceed) as well as two more fragmented policies based on national and regional
emissions targets. Stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450 and 550 ppm
CO2-e requires a dramatic reduction of carbon emissions compared to baseline levels.
Mitigation pathways for the 450 CO2-e target are largely overlapping with the 550 CO2-e
pathways in the first half of the century, and the lower level is achieved through rapid reductions
in atmospheric concentrations in the second half of the century aided by negative anthropogenic
carbon flows. A fragmented scenario designed to extrapolate current levels of ambition into
the future falls short of the emissions reductions required under the harmonized targets. In a
more aggressive scenario intended to capture a break from observed levels of stringency,
emissions are still somewhat higher in the second half due to unabated emissions from non-
participating countries, emphasizing that a phase-out of global emissions in the long term
can only be reached with full global participation. A key finding is that a large range of
energy-related CO2 emissions can be compatible with a given long-term target, depending
on assumptions about carbon cycle response, non-CO2 and land use CO2 emissions
abatement, partly explaining the spread in mitigation costs.
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1 Introduction
Despite the continuing evolution of international climate policy negotiations, including the
pledges made under the Copenhagen Accord in 2010 and the new pathway to a post-Kyoto
agreement established by the Durban Platform in 2011, as well as a variety of other
initiatives at the national and regional level, the extent and nature of mitigation effort to
be undertaken by the world’s economies over the long term remain highly uncertain. Many
countries around the world have expressed support for a notional goal of limiting the change
in global average surface temperature above the pre-industrial level to 2 °C (UNFCCC
2010), motivated by scientific findings concerning the potential impacts of warming beyond
such a level (e.g. in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, IPCC 2007). Due to unresolved
scientific uncertainty about many complex aspects of the global climate system, it is not
straightforward to map a temperature goal into a corresponding emissions pathway (Rogelj
et al. 2011); nor is there consensus from a cost-benefit perspective, owing primarily to the
extreme difficulty of valuing potential damages but also to more subjective questions about
preferences and discounting, that such a goal is in fact optimal from a social perspective (Tol
2008).
Nonetheless, several recent studies have examined the 2 °C challenge with particular
emphasis on the current context of delayed global action. See for example Jakob et al.
(2012), Rogelj et al. (2012), van Vliet et al. (2012), Kriegler et al. (2013), Luderer et al.
(2013), and Riahi et al. (2013). In this paper we compare and analyze results from the
Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) 27 exercise, in which 18 modeling groups ran coordinated
scenarios with systematic variation of both policy and technology assumptions. Our focus
is the comparison of alternative policy regimes, including a fresh look at conventional
long-term targets as well as two new scenarios more closely tied to potential real-world
actions. The analysis explores in depth the sectoral allocation of mitigation under tight
harmonized targets, which varies significantly across models, and the implications of
fragmented action in the long-term. The paper first discusses methodology, then reviews results
from both the global and regional perspective, and finally concludes with a summary of
key findings.
2 Methods
The global target scenarios were specified in terms of a long-term target for radiative
forcing.1 This approach has been used in the last two EMF climate scenario exercises,
namely EMF21 (Weyant et al. 2006) which first introduced non-CO2 greenhouse gas
mitigation into the analysis, and EMF22 (Clarke et al. 2009), which first introduced
incomplete participation in addition to multi-gas analysis. In these two previous exercises,
policy scenarios were constructed with a constraint on total radiative forcing from all
greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol. An important extension in EMF27 is that
the constraint here is placed on a more comprehensive definition of radiative forcing,
which we call AN3A forcing, inclusive of most non-gas forcing agents in addition to
the forcing from greenhouse gases covered by both the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols.
The Non-Kyoto substances include both warming (tropospheric ozone, black carbon,
1 A target for temperature instead may prove to be a more policy-relevant formulation, but it will require further
methodological work on uncertainty and the representation of climate dynamics in integrated assessment models.
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Montreal gases, stratospheric water vapor) and cooling substances (sulfate aerosols, organic
carbon, indirect aerosol effects on cloud albedo, stratospheric ozone).2
One implication of this change is that the results across models are potentially more
closely harmonized with respect to ultimate climate effects, since the more inclusive
radiative forcing measure is a better (though still imperfect and uncertain) indicator of the
climate response than the Kyoto subset. In addition, though non-Kyoto forcers are much less
well understood and modeled than Kyoto gases, their combined forcing in 2005 was
potentially large and net negative in magnitude (IPCC 2007, Chapter 2). The sign may
change over time and will be model and scenario dependent, but since many of these agents
are driven by fossil fuel use, its evolution will be correlated with mitigation effort.
Accounting for this correlation could substantively change the dynamics of meeting the
target and play an important part in determining the climate outcome of stabilization
pathways (Rose et al. this issue). Two additional factors confound the inclusion of non-
Kyoto forcing agents in the analysis. First, most models do not have sufficient detail to
describe the technologies and costs associated with reducing emissions of aerosols and
ozone pre-cursors. Second, for agents thought to exhibit net negative forcing, such as sulfur
aerosols, the application of a climate-focused policy would create an incentive to increase
emissions, whereas local air quality and health concerns would motivate regulations to limit
emissions. Resolving this trade-off is beyond the scope of this study, and beyond the
capabilities of most participating models. As a consequence, models in the study were
directed to control only Kyoto gas emissions, even if they include non-Kyoto substances
endogenously (that is, their levels determined as functions of energy and land-use activities),
but impose the nominal stabilization target on the AN3A forcing.
The AN3A forcing target levels were set to 2.8 W/m2 in 2100, allowing for overshoot
before 2100, and 3.7 W/m2 that was not to be exceeded during the 21st century. The more
stringent target translates to roughly 2.4-2.7 W/m2 full forcing in 2100, and thus has a
similar level of stringency as the RCP2.6 (Representative Concentration Pathway; van
Vuuren et al. 2011b) that has been investigated in an ensemble of climate models
(CMIP5). For simplicity, we use the labels 450 ppm CO2-e (=2.6 W/m
2) and 550 ppm
CO2-e (=3.7 W/m
2) for the two targets. In both scenarios, full “where” (region), “what”
(sector or source), and “when” flexibility of emissions reductions was assumed, ensuring
that the least cost set of mitigation options was selected. This assumption is consistent with a
globally uniform carbon price.
The study also considers two alternative policy regimes, termed the Fragmented Policy
(FP) case and a scenario based on the broadly defined goal articulated in recent years by
leaders in the G8. The FP and G8 scenarios differ from the stabilization scenarios in two
important ways. They do not adopt a long term stabilization target, but specify
emissions reductions timetables on a regional level. They also include limitations on
“where” and “when” flexibility of emissions reductions, giving rise to emissions price
differentials between regions and non-smooth price paths over time. The scenarios are
specified based on three country groupings. Group I comprises the Annex I countries to
the UNFCCC with the exception of Russia. This group acts collaboratively on climate
change aiming at a joint 50 % emissions reduction relative to 2005 until 2050 in the FP
scenario, and an 80 % reduction relative to 1990 in the G8 scenario. Group III contains
2 Following the approach in van Vuuren et al. (2011b), we exclude three agents whose forcing is more speculative
and often treated exogenously in the models: nitrate aerosols, mineral dust aerosols, and land use albedo changes
(Abbreviated 3A). The median estimate for 3A forcing in IPCC (2007) is −0.3 W/m2. We refer to the total
controlled anthropogenic forcing in this study as AN(ot)3A forcing. See Rose et al. (this issue) for more details.
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major fossil fuel producers, in particular the Middle East OPEC countries, Russia and
Former Soviet Union states of Central Asia. This group never joins the climate policy
regime in either scenario (despite the reference to “all countries” in the G8 statement).
Group II includes the remaining countries, including least developed countries and emerging
economies such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa (the so-called BASIC countries).
They adopt their Copenhagen pledges, if available, until 2020 as domestic targets in both
scenarios. After 2020 the two scenarios diverge: in FP, Group II countries adopt emissions
reductions at a slowly increasing level of ambition with very limited emissions trading
between them and Group I. In the G8 scenario, they join Group I countries to aim at a joint
reduction of Group I+II emissions by 50 % relative to 1990 in 2050, with full trade allowed
between the two groups after 2020. Excerpts from the EMF27 Scenario Protocol detailing
the policy specifications are provided in the Supplementary Material.
The inclusion of bottom-up policy scenarios represents another important extension in
EMF 27. Rather than using models to calculate what would be required to achieve a global
stabilization target (i.e. top-down framing), these scenarios begin with more tangible,
potentially realistic assumptions about what commitments individual countries might make
(i.e. bottom-up framing) and use models to assess both how the commitments could be met
and what the implications would be for the long-term climate. Their formulation is not as
clean as the global target scenarios in that a broader set of input assumptions is required, but
we have attempted to define them in terms of concise storylines. The intuitive motivation for
the FP case is to consider a possible future in which countries adopt targets of a stringency
calibrated to a “willingness to pay” measure based on observed targets set under the Kyoto
Protocol. In that instance, wealthier countries agreed to deeper cuts below a projected
baseline; in the FP case in this study, (most) countries take on larger reductions as their
incomes grow according to a formula derived from the observed Kyoto commitments.3 The
result turns out to be a relatively weak regime in terms of the global outcome by the end of
the century, although this can vary by model and across regions within a model due to
variation in baseline assumptions. On the other hand, the G8 scenario is intended to capture a
break from observed levels of stringency in favor of more aggressive action. Although the
original articulation of the goal called for a reduction of total global emissions by 50 % in
2050 (relative to 1990), we acknowledge as in the FP case that certain countries may never
participate. Rather than assume compensation of non-participants by countries in the regime,
we adopt an arguably more plausible interpretation in which the numerical target is applied
only to the participating group of countries, which is still very inclusive. Moreover, the
systematic exclusion of Group III allows an assessment of leakage and inefficiencies
introduced by an incomplete coalition.
3 Results
Results of the model comparison across policy scenarios are divided into a discussion of
global and regional outcomes. In the global context we examine the magnitude of emissions
reductions across sources, climate outcomes and the role of negative emissions, and costs
across scenarios with emphasis on the implications of flexibility. Secondly we explore the
regional implications of policy fragmentation in terms of mitigation and costs.
3 This formulation is based on the suggestion in Frankel (2007), in which negotiated reductions relative to a
base year were translated into reductions from an expected baseline.
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3.1 Global policy outcomes: emissions and forcing
Stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentrations at 450 and 550 ppm CO2-e requires a dramatic
reduction of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use and industry (FF&I) compared to baseline
levels (Fig. 1a). While all models project an increase ranging from a doubling to a
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Fig. 1 Top panel (a): Global FF&I CO2 emissions (solid lines, left axis) and Total Radiative Forcing
(dashed lines, right axis) for five policy scenarios under default technology assumptions (baseline forcing
not shown). Bottom panel (b): Total CO2-equivalent emissions by source (lefthand side showing FF&I CO2
corresponds to top panel) for 450 CO2-e case for models covering at least CO2, CH4, and N2O (corresponding
baseline range also shown). a NPV abatement costs (PE models) 2010–2100 (b) NPV consumption losses
(GE models) 2010–2100
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quadrupling of emissions over the 21st century in the baseline, FF&I CO2 emissions are
reduced by a factor of three or more from present day levels of approximately 30 GtCO2 in
the 550 ppm CO2-e scenario (except in model, WITCH, discussed further below), and are
phased out entirely or even turn negative in the 450 ppm CO2-e scenario.
The increased stringency of emissions reductions in the 450 ppm scenario is particularly
evident in the 2nd half of the century. Most models show net negative CO2 emissions in the
energy sector from the deployment of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS).
The negative emissions are used to compensate residual fossil fuel emissions from energy
and excess emissions in the first half of the century. This solution is facilitated by the fact
that the 450 ppm CO2-e scenario allows for overshooting of the radiative forcing target prior
to 2100. In essence, emitters borrow in the near term against the future opportunity to “print
credits” via net negative emissions. The allowance for overshoot means there is no imposed
limit to “indebtedness” as long as the balance is zero by the end of the century, although the
deployment of negative emissions technologies in models is subject to constraints and
decreasing returns to scale, as are all mitigation options. Even so, the combination of a
negative emissions technology such as BECCS with a target which binds only at the end of
the time horizon can lead to a particularly pronounced overshoot pattern with significant net
negative emissions towards the end of the century. On the other hand, the 550 ppm CO2-e
scenario not only imposes a less stringent mitigation requirement, but also does not allow for
overshoot of the forcing target. The requirement that forcing never exceed the target level
allows less “when” flexibility relative to the case when overshoot is allowed, since it effectively
places a limit on “indebtedness” during the transition. As a consequence, the CO2 FF&I
emissions trajectories for the two stabilization targets turn out to be similar in the first half of
the century (provided negative emissions technologies will be available).
The FP scenario, designed to extrapolate current levels of ambition into the future, falls
short of the emissions reductions required under a 450 or 550 ppm CO2-e target. Models
project CO2 FF&I emissions peaking around mid-century and returning to approximately
present day levels. The G8 scenario, allowing for a group of fossil resource rich countries
that do not join the global regime, shows much stronger emissions reductions. Its level of
stringency is in the range of the 450 and 550 ppm CO2-e targets for the first half of the
century, but global emissions are somewhat higher in the second half due to the unabated
emissions from non-participating countries, emphasizing that a phase-out of global emis-
sions in the long term can only be reached with full global participation.
Total radiative forcing outcomes, shown in Fig. 1a and Figure S1 (supplementary material),
are harmonized by design for the two global target scenarios. Some variation exists because of
differences in the non-controlled agents (3A forcing) and because of differences in calibration
and timing, but for the most part the pathways are very similar across models. Forcing in the G8
case falls in a range between the 450 and 550 CO2-e targets, and reaches approximately
5 W/m2 (or 700 ppm CO2-e) in 2100 in the FP case. The extent of overshoot in the 450
CO2-e case during the century is in the range of 0.5–0.9W/m
2. By contrast, as discussed in
Krey et al. (this issue) and Blanford et al. (this issue), there is very little overshoot above the
target when technologies associated with negative emissions are restricted. This pattern has
important implications for the temperature outcome associated with the target. Because of the
lag between forcing and temperature response, an overshoot forcing pathway need not lead to
an overshoot temperature pathway. However, temperature is directly related to the time path of
forcing, so that the greater the overshoot, the higher the temperature outcome. Although models
in EMF27 report temperature change, they have varying degrees of sophistication in their
climate modules, implying that findings may be less reliable than simulations with full general
circulation models. These results are found in Kriegler et al. (this issue, supplementary material),
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and more generally the uncertain relationship between emissions paths and possible temperature
outcomes is discussed in Rogelj et al. (2011).
Forcing and climate outcomes depend not only on the CO2 fossil fuel and industry
emissions, but also on CO2 emissions from land use and emissions of non-CO2 greenhouse
gases and other radiative agents. Because the non-Kyoto contribution, while potentially of
large negative magnitude today, is projected to decrease significantly with mitigation (Rose
et al. this issue), the imposition of a target on total forcing essentially limits the amount of
cumulative Kyoto gas emissions over the 21st century. Figure 1b demonstrates the roles of
the land-use and non-CO2 sources relative to the energy system in reaching the 450 CO2-e
goal (Figure S2 shows the same results for the 550 CO2-e target). Non-CO2 emissions are
shown in CO2-equivalent terms using 100-year GWPs.
We first note that the scale of FF&I emissions is much greater than the other two sources, and
projected baseline growth much faster, yet its emissions decline most rapidly and cumulative
reductions dwarf those elsewhere. Clearly the energy sector is the primary venue for mitigation.
For non-CO2 sources, which include (among others) agriculture, industry, and landfills, baseline
emissions growmore slowly and (based on the current parameterization inmost models) there are
relatively limited opportunities for abatement. Still, the variation in emissions pathways in the
policy scenario has implications for allowable emissions from other sources. For example, the
WITCH model has the lowest non-CO2 trajectory and the highest FF&I trajectory (also for the
550 CO2-e case, as observed above). Finally, the role of land-use emissions is potentially
important, but only a few models fully incorporate land-based activities into the mitigation
strategy. Most notable is the GCAM model, in which an extremely rapid decrease in LUC
emissions (i.e. net increase in the terrestrial CO2 sink through afforestation) allows a delayed
decline in emissions in the energy sector. Towards the end of the century however, GCAM
projects a decline in this negative sink as land use for biomass production increases to facilitate
negative emissions in the energy sector through BECCS. By contrast, the MESSAGE model
shows the opposite trend with an increasingly negative flow in both LUC and FF&I emissions.
Further, it is observed that models show a large spread in cumulative (2011–2100) total
Kyoto gas emissions: 550 GtCO2-e (1750–2300 GtCO2-e) and 800 GtCO2-e (2460–3260
GtCO2-e) for the 450 and 550 ppm CO2-e stabilization targets, respectively (Kriegler et al.
this issue, supplementary material). A key factor for this spread is variation in the treatment
of the carbon cycle, in particular the extent of temperature feedbacks and other changes in
uptake that impact the evolution of the airborne fraction, that is, the portion of emitted
carbon retained in the atmosphere (Figures S3 and S4 in Supplementary Material). Thus
uncertainty about the carbon cycle has a considerable influence on the remaining CO2
budget under a stabilization target. It is particularly relevant for low stabilization targets
where the range of variation is large relative to the allowable budget and therefore has a
greater impact on mitigation pathways and costs. We also note that the dynamics of the
airborne fraction of anthropogenic CO2 are important for the ability to temporarily overshoot
the forcing target with the use of negative emissions. The slower the airborne fraction
declines due to climate feedbacks, the more limited the ability to overshoot. An appropriate
treatment of the carbon cycle and the associated uncertainty is therefore important for the
assessment of low stabilization pathways.4
Model differences in sectoral allocation of effort are compounded by the variation in carbon
cycle formulation, resulting in even larger spread for the admissible CO2 budget from fossil fuel
4 Analysis of the variation of carbon cycle modules in integrated assessment models and how they compare to
more complex carbon-cycle models has been conducted by Hof et al. (2012) van Vuuren et al. (2011a), and
Arora et al. (2013).
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use and industry. The cumulative FF&I CO2 emissions from 2011 through 2100 (i.e. the integral
of the time paths shown in the figure) vary by a factor of two between the models (680–1400
GtCO2 in the 450 ppm CO2-e case and 1260–2340 GtCO2 in the 550 ppm CO2-e case; Kriegler
et al. this issue, supplementary material). These observations culminate in a fundamentally
important point: with so many systems and sources acting on the final outcome expressed in
terms of a target forcing level, and with considerable uncertainty about how those systems work
or may evolve in the future, many different combinations ofmitigation activities can be modeled
as consistent with the same outcome. Thus, while the results of this study do provide some
compelling insights into the scale of mitigation involved and the roles of key technologies and
sources, they do not support specific conclusions about what is “required” in any particular
sector to meet ambitious climate goals. Rather the breadth of participating models demonstrates
a variety of alternative pathways and strategies.
3.2 Global policy outcomes: mitigation costs
Global policy cost metrics include both a price on carbon, reflecting the stringency of the
mitigation requirement at themargin, and a gross economic cost. For comparability across models,
we adopt an economic cost metric equal to consumption loss relative to baseline when available,
substituted by proxy measures in partial equilibrium models, expressed as a fraction of baseline
GDP. Note that this metric does not incorporate potential climate damages; we have undertaken a
cost-effectiveness analysis only for the targets specified. For simplicity, we present here an average
of carbon prices over the 2010–2100 horizon weighted by a discount factor (but not by emissions)
and a net present value (NPV) total for economic costs.5 Although there are important dynamic
effects in certain cases, collapsing the time dimension preserves the essential insights.
For the global stabilization regimes at 450 and 550 ppm CO2-e, the study protocol stipulated
universal emissions pricing across regions and sources to ensure the selection of the cheapest
globally available mitigation option at the margin. The reported time-average carbon price for the
550 CO2-e target ranged from $5 to $50 per tCO2 and for the 450 CO2-e target from $12 to $92
per tCO2 (Figure S5, supplementary material).
6 Reported NPV total economic costs reflect a
similarly broad range, from a 0.4% to 8.0% relative to baseline for the 550 CO2-e target and from
0.8 % to 11.7 % for the 450 CO2-e target (Fig. 2—note different metrics described in caption).
Despite the wide range of variation, both the carbon price and the economic cost metrics increase
by roughly a factor of 1.5 to 2.5 from the 550 to the 450 CO2-e target (with a few exceptions).
The range of costs emerges for a variety of reasons. First, the scale of the mitigation
requirement to meet a physical target depends on model baseline assumptions as well as on
the representation of physical systems, as discussed above. Moreover, the varying extent of
mitigation options in land-use and non-CO2 emissions implies a broader range for the scale of
effort within the energy sector, which has the dominant share of abatement and also in most
cases the marginal abatement activity.7 To control for these effects, Fig. 2 and Figure S5 plot the
cost metrics against mitigation scale as measured by the fraction of cumulative FF&I CO2
emissions abated. Comparing the 450 CO2-e results to those for the 550 CO2-e scenario, the
5 In both cases a discount rate of 5 % was used ex post, though it should be noted that individual models may
use different rates and treat time preferences differently.
6 Note that in all cases the price rises significantly over time, so that high future levels are suppressed by
reporting only the time-average price.
7 Models generally assume that the land use and non-CO2 sources are characterized by a limited amount of low
cost mitigation options followed by steeply risingmarginal costs of further emissions reductions (Figure S6). Once
these options are exhausted, additional reductions must occur in the energy sector, whose marginal abatement cost
curve is less convex. Further research on non-energy abatement options could change this characterization.
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majority of models shows similar cost increases in the range of 1–1.5 % NPV losses for an
additional 15% reduction of cumulative FF&I baseline emissions above 550 ppmCO2-e levels,
with a few models showing lower cost increases from a lower cost base. Beyond scale, other
important differences include the cost and availability of mitigation technologies and options,
including substitution opportunities on the demand side, and certain aspects of model structure.
The option for negative emissions, e.g. through BECCS, can play a strong role in determining
costs and feasibility particularly for the 450 CO2-e target.
8 It is important to note that a larger set
of models have calculated the 550 ppm CO2-e than the 450 ppm CO2-e target so that a
comparison of cost ranges between the two is subject to a sampling bias (Tavoni and Tol
2010). A special case is the IMACLIM model, which includes a more extensive treatment of
non-carbon distortions and externalities. In this setting the introduction of a carbon price
without accompanying measures to address other market failures leads to much higher eco-
nomic costs (Bibas and Méjean 2013).
Figure 2 also demonstrates that the G8 scenario results in less mitigation at a higher cost relative
to the “frontier” implied by the line linking the two global target scenarios with full flexibility. The
inefficiency results from forgoing available abatement options in the non-participatory Group III
countries, and also from the limited “when” flexibility implied by the requirement to meet a specific
emissions goal in 2050. Not shown are the costs for the FP scenario, which is much less stringent
than the other three but more inefficient due to the enforcement of specific emissions targets on
individual countries and regions with limits to trading (which also leads to different carbon prices in
different regions). For very stringent mitigation goals, these sources of inefficiency could signifi-
cantly increase the costs of an already ambitious endeavor.
3.3 Implications of regional fragmentation
We conclude our results by assessing the impacts of the four climate policies analyzed in this
study on developed (Group I), currently developing (Group II) and energy-exporting regions
8 See Krey et al. (this issue) for further discussion on the impact of technology availability on costs.
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Fig. 2 Global net present value (NPV) policy costs for the period 2010–2100 (discounted at 5 %) for the 450 and
550 ppm CO2e targets and the G8 policy scenario. Includes only models with results reported to 2100. The partial
equilibrium (PE) models report costs in terms of area under the marginal abatement cost curve (expressed in
percentage of GDP in the baseline); the general equilibrium (GE) models report consumption losses (expressed in
percentage of consumption in the baseline). Costs are plotted against cumulative FF&I CO2 emissions reductions
as a fraction of cumulative emissions in the baseline.Dashed lines connect 450 and 550 CO2-e scenario results for
individual models producing both cases. Outside the plotted range are consumption losses for IMACLIM at 8.0%
(550 ppm), 11.7 % (450 ppm) and 6.7 % (G8) for the period 2010–2100
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(Group III). Figure 3 shows FF&I CO2 emissions in the three groups in the FP and G8 policy
scenarios relative to the baseline. It is clear that future growth in the baseline is driven almost
entirely by Group II and III countries (see Blanford et al. 2012). Emissions from non-participating
Group III become large relative to residual emissions in the rest of the world, especially in the G8
case. The major difference between the two policies is the extent of mitigation in Group II
countries, which take on an extremely aggressive commitment in the G8 case and a more modest
(but not trivial) one in the FP scenario, although the implications of the income-based reduction
formula vary widely by model.9
9 One consequence of the bottom-up formulation is that model differences in relative growth rates across
regions are emphasized in these scenarios, revealing an important dimension of variation and uncertainty that
tends not to emerge as clearly with a harmonized target.
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Fig. 3 Top panel (a): G8 Scenario FF&I CO2 Emissions by Group; Bottom panel (b): FP Scenario FF&I CO2
Emissions by Group. Includes all models reporting scenario results. Regional definitions vary by model,
accounting for some of the base year discrepancy. Corresponding baseline ranges shown in grey
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One of the most policy relevant implications of integrated assessment modeling of
climate mitigation pathways is the extent to which countries and regions are affected by
alternative policy regimes. Since participation in any international agreement is voluntary,
particular scrutiny will be given domestically to the technical, economic, and social reper-
cussions of policies before joining a coalition, especially relative to the other members.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of costs and abatement across the three groups for the
550 ppm-eq policy (results are similar for the 450 case). In this study, the target has been
implemented with an efficient allocation of abatement across regions—no redistribution
through CO2 permit allocation was indicated (though individual models may use different
assumptions). It thus represents a limiting case in which all countries face an equal carbon
price without any ex post compensation (an unlikely political outcome but an important
starting point for analysis). Models find that in this setting, policy costs are significantly
greater in developing and energy exporting regions than in industrialized countries (as in
Tavoni et al. 2013). The diversity of policy costs across regions is a striking result, though it
is not a new one in the literature (e.g. Clarke et al. 2009). Given that all regions face the same
price of carbon, it is intuitive to attribute the disparity in costs to a different level of
abatement: if developing countries have more abatement opportunities (e.g. due to more
inefficient capital), they will abate more and incur larger economic losses. However, the
right panel of Fig. 4 shows that, cumulatively to 2050, abatement compared to industrialized
countries is proportionally similar for energy-exporters, and only somewhat higher in
developing countries.
This finding suggests that there are important additional drivers of regional differences in
policy costs (see also Tavoni et al. 2013). We highlight two examples. First, developing
countries devote a greater fraction of their economy to energy; this is particularly important
when regional economies are aggregated using market exchange rates, the current
practice for most participating models. Second, terms of trade related to the global
markets (especially, but not exclusively, energy markets) are very important for energy-
exporting countries. For example, climate policies would simultaneously reduce the
consumption and price of fossil fuel products, with important repercussions on economies
highly dependent on energy revenues. Indeed, Group III (orange markers) is the region
most penalized in terms of (uncompensated) policy costs. Given the strategic role which this
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part of the world plays in international affairs, more analysis is warranted (see Leimbach et al.
(2009) and Massetti and Tavoni (2011)).
The G8 and FP scenarios excluded explicit mitigation commitment in Group III out of the
recognition that involving energy exporting countries in international climate agreements is
a challenging endeavor. General equilibrium effects, e.g. through changes in global market
prices, would nonetheless impact the region even in the absence of a domestic climate
policy. A decomposition of the major effects is shown in Fig. 5. Economic activity, as
measured by GDP, contracts in most models in both the FP and G8 policies, and especially
in the latter, despite the lack of a mitigation requirement. This result is not trivial since the
terms of trade effect on energy markets could in principle be compensated by relocation of
energy intensive industries.10 Second, oil extraction—which is the dominant source of
revenues in energy markets—also contracts, with a reduction of up to 25 % in cumulative
extraction through 2050. Extraction is also not done in advance, providing no indication of a
‘green paradox’ effect in which oil suppliers increase quantity in response to a carbon price
(Sinn 2012). Some models exhibit a partial compensation by increased extraction of gas
(a less carbon intensive alternative), while others depict contraction in both markets due
to a shift to low carbon sources and lower energy demand. Third, total primary energy
increases in most models both in total and relative to GDP (energy intensity), suggesting
a ‘rebound effect’ due to lower energy prices. In half of the models carbon intensity
declines, as the reduced demand for gas and oil by Groups I and II forestalls their
replacement by more carbon intensive fuels in Group III; others project increases in
carbon intensity. The resulting impact on emissions indicates moderate leakage, stronger in the
G8 scenario, with a maximum of 13 %, while a few models show emissions reductions driven
by reductions in carbon intensity.
10 Only a few models represent energy-intensive industries and trade in non-energy goods with sufficient
disaggregation to directly assess the potential extent of “off-shoring”.
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4 Conclusions
In the last EMF study of global climate policies (EMF22, Clarke et al. 2009), roughly half of
participating models found a feasible solution for the 450 ppm CO2-e target, even allowing
for overshoot. In this study, nearly every model can find a feasible pathway. Two factors
explain this change: first, by including non-Kyoto forcing agents in the definition of CO2-
equivalent forcing, the current median estimate of total forcing is further below the target
level (although this is less relevant in the context of an overshoot target). Second and more
importantly, more models have added a technological option for negative emissions, in most
cases BECCS in the electric sector. With this option, the mitigation pathways identified by
models for the 450 CO2-e target are largely overlapping with the 550 CO2-e not-to-exceed
pathways in the first half of the century, and the lower level is achieved through rapid
reductions in atmospheric concentrations in the second half of the century aided by negative
anthropogenic carbon flows. This pattern notwithstanding, participating models exhibit
diverse combinations of mitigation across sources, depth of overall cuts, and gross and
marginal costs for the same target. A key finding is that a large range of cumulative CO2
emissions from fossil fuel use and industry can be compatible with the 450 and 550 ppm
CO2-e stabilization targets, depending on assumptions about carbon cycle response, Non-
CO2 and land use CO2 emissions abatement. Part of the spread in mitigation costs can be
explained by the differences in the scale of the FF&I CO2 emissions reductions.
This study introduces two policy scenarios formulated in terms of national and regional
emissions constraints to counter the globally harmonized targets. A stylized implementation of
the G8 target including the assumption of a group of non-participating countries results in
limiting forcing to the range between 450 and 550 CO2-e, but with higher costs relative to the
cumulative level of abatement than the globally harmonized pathway. The FP scenario
representing an extrapolation of demonstrated levels of ambition results in forcing around
700 CO2-e by the end of the century, in most cases still growing. Models depict higher
economic costs in developing countries for comparable or slightly higher levels of abatement
in a setting with no ex post compensation, and energy-exporting countries could incur costs
even in a regime fromwhich they abstain. The results emphasize the importance of international
cooperation and a break from the current trajectory of policy commitments if climate outcomes
in the vicinity of the 2 °C goal are to be achieved. The dependence of this goal on negative
emissions in future decades must be brought to the fore in the policy debate.
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